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COI QUERY RESPONSE – Iraq

Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq militia

1. Information on Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq militia

Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) was formed in 2006 to fight against the US presence in Iraq.[1] It is one of the Shia militia groups in Iraq supported by Iran to maintain its influence in the country.[2] AAH sees itself as a part of Iran's so-called 'axis of resistance'[3] while maintaining 'a degree of independence' in its operations.[4] The militia became a crucial member of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)[5] after 2014,[6] and operates three PMF brigades, namely the 41st, 42nd, and 43rd brigade.[7] As such, it is financed by the Iraqi state[8] while it is also reportedly financed by Iran.[9] According to Jawad Mahdi, an expert on armed groups in Iraq writing for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (TWI), AAH 'enjoys powerful privileges, extensive influence, and financial benefits as it operates within parts of the Iraqi government.'[10]

According to 2019-2021 estimates, provided by BBC Monitoring in February 2025, AAH is the second largest Iran-linked PMF force in Iraq, after the Badr organisation, with over 10 000 members.[11] AAH has been described as being 'heavily armed'[12] and 'one of Iraq's most powerful Iran-aligned armed group'.[13] According to an article by the The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) dated March 2024, 'most PMF operations commanders are senior members of Iranian-backed militias such as Asaib Ahl al Haq and the Badr Organization.' In the case of AAH, this includes the commanders of the Baghdad Operations Command and Salah ad Din Operations Command.[14] Concerning the presence of AAH across Iraq, the group is headquartered in Baghdad but it also operates in other governorates including Salah al-Din,

[1] BBC Monitoring, Explainer: Who are Iraq's Popular Mobilisation Forces?, 21 February 2025, url; TWI, Profile: Asaib Ahl al-Haq, updated 21 October 2023, url
[2] CRS, Iran-Supported Groups in the Middle East and U.S. Policy, 26 September 2024, url; Iran Wire, Iran's Deepening Influence in Iraq: Proxy Forces, Politics, and Power, 16 December 2024, url
[3] 'Axis of Resistance is a term used to describe a loose network of Iran-backed Shia militias that regularly execute attacks against US and Israeli targets throughout the Middle East.' See: FPRI, Narrative Intelligence: Decoding Iran's Influence Campaigns in Iraq, 22 August 2025, url
[4] TWI, Profile: Asaib Ahl al-Haq, updated 21 October 2023, url
[5] Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) are also known as Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), and Al-Hashd Al-Shaabi in Arabic. See: EUAA, Iraq - Security Situation, May 2024, url, pp. 13, 33-35
[6] BBC Monitoring, Explainer: Who are Iraq's Popular Mobilisation Forces?, 21 February 2025, url
[7] BBC Monitoring, Explainer: Who are Iraq's Popular Mobilisation Forces?, 21 February 2025, url
[8] TWI, Profile: Asaib Ahl al-Haq, updated 21 October 2023, url
[9] BBC Monitoring, Explainer: Who are Iraq's Popular Mobilisation Forces?, 21 February 2025, url; TWI, Profile: Asaib Ahl al-Haq, updated 21 October 2023, url
[10] TWI, Injecting New Blood into Militias: The Gradual Takeover of Iraqi Higher Education by the Popular Mobilization Forces, 12 July 2024, url
[11] BBC Monitoring, Explainer: Who are Iraq's Popular Mobilisation Forces?, 21 February 2025, url
[12] Reuters, Explainer: Iraq's competing Shi'ite armed factions and parties, 18 February 2024, url
[13] 964media, Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq official: Iran doesn't need Iraqi faction support in current conflict, 23 June 2025, url
[14] ISW, The Leadership and Purpose of Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces, 19 March 2024, url

Kirkuk, Diyala, Ninewa,[15] Anbar, and Diyala.[16] The AAH has been also linked to Kataib Sarkhat al-Quds (formerly known as Ashab al-Kahf), another Iran-backed group present in Iraq.[17]

AAH is affiliated with the political party al-Sadiqoun [also referred to as Sadiqoun][18] and the leader of both is Qais al-Khazali [also refered to as Khazali].[19] Through its political wing, AAH is represented in the government cabinet through an AAH-affiliated minister of education,[20] as well as having the control over the governance of the Babil province.[21]

During an interview aired by Al-Ahd TV in December 2024, al-Khazali stated that AAH is 'guided by the words of the Supreme Leader [of Iran], which are legally and morally binding' while adding that 'every resistance [group] must act according to its circumstances in its country.'[22] In a speech from February 2025, al-Khazali shared 'his vision of reconfiguring Iraq as a «resistance state» (dawlat al-muqawama), in which the armed forces, the mobilised polity and the state's legal framework would jointly serve as pillars of the resistance project.'[23]

Since 2020, AAH, as well as al-Khazali personally, have been proscribed as terrorist entities by the US government.[24]

2. Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq's role in Iraqi society, politics, and government

2.1. Political and societal role

Al-Khazali operates AAH, military brigades in PMF, various social and cultural institutions, as well as the political party al-Sadiqoun, and he is reported as having 'considerable influence'

[15] MMP, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, 2025, url
[16] Al-Hurra, Iraqi Militias Mobilize as Iran-Israel Tensions Reignite Talk of "Unified Front", 21 June 2025, url; New Lines Institute, Why Shiites Should Be the Last to Call for U.S. Expulsion, 11 December 2024, url
[17] TWI, Profile: Kataib Sarkhat al-Quds (formerly known as Ashab al-Kahf), updated 18 October 2024, url
[18] TWI, AAH Terrorist Planner Adnan Fayhan Takes Over as Babil Governor, 12 February 2025, url; TWI, Profile: Asaib Ahl al-Haq, updated 21 October 2023, url; MEMRI, Iran-Backed Militias In Iraq: If Israel Or The U.S. Attack Us We Will Strike 'All [Their] Military And Economic Interests' In The Region; 'You Will See Hell With Your Own Eyes', 21 November 2024, url
[19] 964media, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq leader denounces Israeli strike in Doha, calls for UN action, 10 September 2025, url; ISW, Iran Update, September 11, 2025, url
[20] Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis was a deputy commander of PMF, who was killed in January 2020 with the Iranian general Qassem Soleimani. See: NPR, Who Was The Iraqi Commander Also Killed In The Baghdad Drone Strike?, 4 January 2020, url
[21] TWI, AAH Terrorist Planner Adnan Fayhan Takes Over as Babil Governor, 12 February 2025, url
[22] 964media, Qais Al-Khazali denies Iran approved plans to disband PMF, rejects Sulaymaniyah injury Claims, 12 January 2025, url
[23] FES, Coercion, predation and state formation in Libya and Iraq, March 2025, url, pp. 18-19
[24] BBC Monitoring, Explainer: Who are Iraq's Popular Mobilisation Forces?, 21 February 2025, url; USDOS, State Department Terrorist Designations of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Its Leaders, Qays and Laith al-Khazali, 3 January 2020, url. See also: BasNews, US Terror Designations Trigger Panic Among Iran-Backed Militias in Iraq, 20 September 2025, url

over Iraq's politics[25] and security apparatus.[26] According to the analysis by The Mapping Militants Project (MMP), while AAH's primary focus since 2017 is the control of political life, it also 'covertly' continues its 'militant campaign'.[27] Al-Khazali is also a member of the Coordination Framework,[28] a parliamentary bloc consisting of various Shia factions established in October 2021,[29] where he is seen as one of the key leaders (together with the leaders of the Badr organization and Kata'ib Hezbollah).[30] Al-Khazali has been reported as having close links to the Iraqi prime minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani[31] and AAH supported al-Sudani's nomination to become the prime minister and was described as one of his 'early backers'.[32] According to an article by The New Region from February 2025, al-Khazali was one of the political leaders working to remove Falih al-Fayyadh, chairman of Iraq's Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC), from the position. Al-Khazali himself reportedly wanted to become the new head of PMC.[33]

Ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections scheduled to take place in November 2025, 'growing fractures' in the Shia political landscape were reported, and AAH's al-Sadiqoun decided to run independently.[34] In a leaked audio obtained by the same source in June 2025, an AAH commander was heard forcing its members and their families to vote for AAH candidates in the upcoming elections.[35]

AAH's al-Sadiqoun party has increased its presence in the Iraqi parliament from one seat after the 2014 election to 15 seats in 2018 elections,[36] which later dropped to 4-5 seats after the 2021 elections. This election was contested by AAH which staged violent protests in a response.[37]

Al-Sadiqoun's party politics include an opposition to the US presence in Iraq,[38] as well as anti-Israel rhetoric.[39] In April 2025, al-Khazali claimed that Israel is planning 'a conspiracy to divide parts of Syria', alleging that this is due to the Israelis' cooperation with the Kurds.[40] AAH is also at odds with the KRG (Kurdistan Regional Government), whom it accuses of not sharing the

[25] Kurdistan24, Leaked Audio Reveals Militia Vote Manipulation Ahead of Iraq Elections, 8 June 2025, url; War on the Rocks, The Ides of November: Navigating the Shifting Sands of Iraq's 2025 Electoral Landscape, 2 May 2025, url
[26] Kurdistan24, Leaked Audio Reveals Militia Vote Manipulation Ahead of Iraq Elections, 8 June 2025, url; MMP, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, 2025, url
[27] MMP, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, 2025, url
[28] Shafaq News, Explainer: Iraq's Coordination Framework and Its Rise to Power, 9 September 2025, url
[29] Shafaq News, Explainer: Iraq's Coordination Framework and Its Rise to Power, 9 September 2025, url
[30] Amwaj, Iraq's top Shiite cleric slams use of his portrait as debate on PMU's future heats up, 15 August 2025, url
[31] CTC, Iraqi Oil and the Iran Threat Network, April 2025, url
[32] Reuters, Fuel oil smuggling network rakes in $1 billion for Iran and its proxies, 3 December 2024, url
[33] The New Region, Attempts to oust PMC chief and intra-Shiite battle over the position, 8 February 2025, url
[34] Amwaj, Deep Dive: The stakes for Shiite parties in Iraq's elections, 6 Juhne 2025, url
[35] Kurdistan24, Leaked Audio Reveals Militia Vote Manipulation Ahead of Iraq Elections, 8 June 2025, url
[36] TWI, AAH Terrorist Planner Adnan Fayhan Takes Over as Babil Governor, 12 February 2025, url
[37] TWI, Profile: Asaib Ahl al-Haq, updated 21 October 2023, url
[38] 964media, Al-Sadiqoun Bloc calls for immediate end to American presence in Joint Operations Command, 9 February 2024, url; TWI, AAH Terrorist Planner Adnan Fayhan Takes Over as Babil Governor, 12 February 2025, url
[39] TWI, AAH Terrorist Planner Adnan Fayhan Takes Over as Babil Governor, 12 February 2025, url
[40] Jerusalem Post (The), Israel involved in conspiracy to divide parts of Syria, Iraqi militia leader claims, 2 April 2025, url

profit from oil industry.[41] Al-Sadiqoun also opposes Turkish presence in Iraq[42] and called on federal Iraq to end its cooperation with the country in the areas of security and counterterrorism, following the dissolution of the PKK in May 2025.[43]

In March 2025, al-Khazali called for protection of Alawites in Syria following sectarian attacks in the country, referring to the Syrian 'armed groups known for their history of terrorism'.[44] In the same month, he gave a speech in which he demanded from the federal government that PMF should be given more rights by law.[45] In April 2025, AAH, along the other Shia groups, objected to the meeting between the Iraqi prime minister Mohammed al-Sudani and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Baghdad, claiming that al-Shaara can be arrested in Iraq.[46] In the same month, media reports emerged suggesting that some members of Iran-backed militias agreed to disarm but these statements were later contradicted by statements from other militias.[47] Following these debates, in July 2025, al-Khazali publicly rejected disarmament, stating that 'weapons that support and defend the state are rightful weapons' and warning AAH members against handing them over.[48] In August 2025, amid continued discussions about the future of Iran-backed militias in Iraq and about Iran's influence in the country, al-Khazali argued that PMF remain necessary to counter a possible resurgence of Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL).[49]

AAH has influence over the media and it has its own channel Al-Etejah TV,[50] but it is also affiliated with the Alahad TV[51] and the Sabereen News network.[52] According to Reuters, AAH is 'actively involved in social media groups which distribute the messaging of Iran-backed paramilitary factions.'[53] BBC Monitoring reported that Iran-linked groups as a whole also use social media platforms to issue statements including on X, Instagram, Facebook, and Telegram, with tens of thousands of followers and subscribers.[54]

[41] New Region (The), KRG official slams Khazali's remarks against Erbil as 'foolish', 8 June 2025, url
[42] Medya News, Iraqi lawmakers to question defence minister over Turkey-Iraq security deal, 19 September 2024, url; Shafaq News, Iraq's Sadiqoun bloc slams Unconstitutional" deals with Turkiye, 15 April 2025, url; FPRI, Narrative Intelligence: Decoding Iran's Influence Campaigns in Iraq, 22 August 2025, url
[43] The New Region, Khazali urges Iraq to cancel security MoU with Turkey after PKK disbands,12 May 2025, url
[44] 964media, 'Deep concern': Iraqi militia leader Al-Khazali calls for protection of Alawites in Syria, 8 March 2025, url
[45] FDD, Pro-Iran militias parade for 'Quds Day' in Iraq, 31 March 2025, url
[46] EPIC, ISHM: April 17 - 24, 2025, 24 April 2025, url
[47] ISW and CTP, Iran update, April 9, 2025, 9 April 2025, url
[48] 964media, Khazali issues veiled warning against militia disarmament amid regional tensions, 21 July 2025, url
[49] CTP and ISW, Iran Update, August 25, 2025, 25 August 2025, url
[50] BBC Monitoring, Explainer: Who are Iraq's Popular Mobilisation Forces?, 21 February 2025, url
[51] FPRI, Narrative Intelligence: Decoding Iran's Influence Campaigns in Iraq, 22 August 2025, url
[52] BBC Monitoring, Explainer: Who are Iraq's Popular Mobilisation Forces?, 21 February 2025, url
[53] Reuters, Explainer: Iraq's competing Shi'ite armed factions and parties, 18 February 2024, url
[54] BBC Monitoring, Explainer: Who are Iraq's Popular Mobilisation Forces?, 21 February 2025, url

2.1. Economic influence and patronage

In the Iraqi government during the period of 2018-2019, Abdul Amir Hamdan, an archaeologist by training and member of AAH,[55] served as the Minister of Tourism, Culture, and Antiquities.[56] In the cabinet in 2025, al- Sadiqoun holds the ministry of education.[57] According to Michael Knights, an expert on Iran-backed militias,[58] 'AAH has engaged in a persistent campaign to control the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, which oversees more than a million students in Iraq.[59] In 2022, Naeem al-Aboudi, AAH's spokesperson and deputy, became the new Minister of Higher Education. Al-Aboudi provides support to the Sons of al-Muhandis,[60] a group that organises events on universities promoting PMF, Iran, Islamic jurisprudence, and *Wilayat al-Faqih* doctrine, while providing a critical view of the US and Europe al-Aboudi has thus given the group 'the necessary governmental cover for its activities along with the financial and political support'.[61] Another AAH minister is Ali Hamid Kazem al-Shakri, who is the Deputy Minister for Administrative Affairs.[62]

In February 2024, al-Sadiqoun's Adnan Fayhan al-Dulaymi was selected as the new governor of Babil.[63] Previously, Fayhan was identified as the planner of kidnapping and killing of five US personnel in 2007[64] which al-Khazali described as an 'honourable cause' in a May 2025 interview.[65]

TWI reported that AAH makes illicit profit from oil smuggling.[66] According to Michael Knights, AAH gained control of the Ministry of Industry and Mines (MoIM) since 2014-2018, controls the private metal industry sector, and it is involved in oil smuggling operations in Basra. It also reported that AAH has developed 'a close working relationship' with al-Sudani, today's prime minister of Iraq, when he was an acting minister of MoIM.[67] The same source also states that 'AAH and KH also control and tax the fuel oil distribution system at national and local levels' through their own 'security companies'.[68] In December 2024, an article by Reuters stated that

[55] Hudson Institute, Embracing Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq: Pragmatism or Naiveté?, 9 October 2024, url
[56] TWI, Injecting New Blood into Militias: The Gradual Takeover of Iraqi Higher Education by the Popular Mobilization Forces, 12 July 2024, url
[57] Hudson Institute, Embracing Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq: Pragmatism or Naiveté?, 9 October 2024, url
[58] 'Michael Knights is an Adjunct Fellow at The Washington Institute and cofounder of the Militia Spotlight platform, which offers in-depth analysis of developments related to Iran-backed militias.' TWI, Profile: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, updated 20 June 2024, url
[59] TWI, Injecting New Blood into Militias: The Gradual Takeover of Iraqi Higher Education by the Popular Mobilization Forces, 12 July 2024, url
[60] Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis was a deputy commander of PMF, who was killed in January 2020 with the Iranian general Qassem Soleimani. See: NPR, Who Was The Iraqi Commander Also Killed In The Baghdad Drone Strike?, 4 January 2020, url
[61] TWI, Injecting New Blood into Militias: The Gradual Takeover of Iraqi Higher Education by the Popular Mobilization Forces, 12 July 2024, url
[62] TWI, Injecting New Blood into Militias: The Gradual Takeover of Iraqi Higher Education by the Popular Mobilization Forces, 12 July 2024, url
[63] TWI, AAH Terrorist Planner Adnan Fayhan Takes Over as Babil Governor, 12 February 2025, url
[64] Hudson Institute, Embracing Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq: Pragmatism or Naiveté?, 9 October 2024, url
[65] Kurdistan24, 'An Honorable Crime': Qais al-Khazali Boasts of Killing U.S. Soldiers, url
[66] CTC, Iraqi Oil and the Iran Threat Network, April 2025, url
[67] CTC, Iraqi Oil and the Iran Threat Network, April 2025, url
[68] CTC, Iraqi Oil and the Iran Threat Network, April 2025, url

AAH is 'central' to the smuggling of oil from Iraq to Iran which is believed to reach a value of over one billion euro annually.[69] According to the analysis by Janes, AAH also maintains a 'strategic interest' in Baiji oil refinery in Salahaddin province that was attacked by drones on 1 July 2025. The source indicated that 'the refinery is entangled in broader intra-Shia militia competition over economic assets and patronage networks.'[70]

3. Activities and incidents involving Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq

In August 2023, TWI reported on alleged property thefts by militias, including AAH, that have occurred in Baghdad's Jadriyah neighbourhood. In reaction to the affair, Jadriyah residents met with Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and the interior ministry was directed by the prime minister's office to launch an investigation. Several militia members were accused, but none from AAH, which denied having used 'any threats or extortion' against the residents.[71]

According to the research by The Media Line, in the period of December 2023 to December 2024, AAH was involved in violent clashes with other Iran-backed militias in various areas of Iraq, including in Basra and Baghdad, leaving some 200 militia members killed. In most of these incidents, Iraqi authorities did not intervene.[72] In December 2023, clashes between AAH and a group linked to the Sadrist movement, Saraya al-Salam, were reported in Baghdad.[73] The conflict was reportedly caused by political competition and financial interests, and it resulted in killings of several militia members and wounding of civilians, with no intervention by the authorities.[74]

On 31 March 2024, clashes between AAH members and Iraqi security forces erupted in eastern Baghdad over unlicensed vehicles used by the militia, resulting in one officer being killed and two wounded.[75]

In the months following the beginning of the Israel-Gaza war in October 2023, Iran-aligned groups in Iraq were attacking US targets in Iraq and Syria, and their intensity has decreased by March-April 2024.[76] On 18 December 2023, militias targeted an alleged Israeli 'spy centre' in Erbil.[77] Iran-backed militias claimed through their Telegram channel several attacks on Israeli targets, including on Ben Gurion airport and the defence Ministry in March 2024, but BBC Monitoring concluded that these claims could not be verified.[78] In June 2024, AAH threatened to attack US targets in the region if the US 'continues to support this usurping entity (Israel) in

[69] Reuters, Fuel oil smuggling network rakes in $1 billion for Iran and its proxies, 3 December 2024, url
[70] JANES, Iran-backed Iraqi militia attacks against Iraqi infrastructure will likely increase tensions in the lead-up to November elections, 2 September 2025, url
[71] TWI, Coordination Framework Militias Exposed for Stealing Baghdad Real Estate, 31 August 2023, url
[72] The Media Line, Daily Clashes Between Iran-Backed Militias in Iraq Kill Over 200 Fighters, 21 February 2025, url
[73] EISMENA, Iraq shaken by attacks and political unrest: what can we expect?, 27 December 2023, url
[74] Shafaq News, Iraqi Security at Risk: the conflict between Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Saraya Al-Salam, 22 February 2024, url
[75] Shafaq News, Iraqi federal police member killed in clash with Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq in Baghdad, 31 March 2024, url
[76] BBC Monitoring, Explainer: Doubts over Iraqi militia's claims of attacks against Israel, 8 May 2024, url
[77] BBC Monitoring, Explainer: Doubts over Iraqi militia's claims of attacks against Israel, 8 May 2024, url
[78] BBC Monitoring, Explainer: Doubts over Iraqi militia's claims of attacks against Israel, 8 May 2024, url

its expanded operations and attacks on Lebanon and Hezbollah'.[79] In November 2024, Israeli foreign ministry stated that AAH is among Iraqi militias that directly attacked Israel, which the militia group denied.[80] Intensity of real or claimed attacks on Israeli targets has also significantly decreased after November 2024.[81] Following the Iran-Iraq armed conflict in June 2025, al-Khazali refrained from calling his group to conduct armed attacks but instead called on the international community to intervene.[82]

In March 2025, Iran-linked militias were reported to participate at the Quds Day demonstrations, an event used by Iran to fuel anti-Israel sentiment.[83] According to the local news agency Shafaq News, the events draw a limited participation interest, with some 2 000 people gathering in Baghdad, and no senior commanders or government officials were present.[84]

In July 2025, a group of attacks targeted oil infrastructure in the KRI (Kurdistan Region of Iraq), using Iranian drones Shahed-101 previously used by Iran-backed militias in Iraq. The resistance groups, or *muqawama,* have denied any involvement, including the AAH, who blamed KRG instead.[85] The scale of the incident reached around 20 attacks, which temporarily halted the oil production.[86] No group has officially claimed responsibility[87] and there were no reported casualties.[88] KRI authorities alleged that the attack was carried out by groups linked to PMF, without specifying which ones, while also denying the rumours that there were any Israeli bases in KRI.[89] Iran-linked militias have repeatedly accused KRI of maintaining ties with Israel.[90]

[79] Xinhua, Iraqi militia leader threatens attack on U.S. interests, 25 June 2024, url
[80] TWI, Iraqi Militias Downscaling Their Anti-Israel Actions, 26 November 2024, url
[81] TWI, Iraqi Militias Downscaling Their Anti-Israel Actions, 26 November 2024, url
[82] TWI, Qais al-Khazali Tries, Fails to Tone Down Militant Bluster, 26 June 2025, url
[83] FDD, Pro-Iran militias parade for 'Quds Day' in Iraq, 31 March 2025, url
[84] Shafaq News, Quds Day in Iraq: low turnout, absent leaders, 28 March 2025, url
[85] TWI, Militias Strain Credibility by Denying Involvement in Kurdistan Drone Attacks, 25 July 2025, url
[86] FDD, Can Iraq Stop the Iranian-Backed Drone Attacks?, 4 August 2025, url; The Jerusalem Post, New drone strike near Erbil adds to growing attacks on Kurdistan region - analysis, 30 July 2025, url
[87] The Arab Weekly, Pro-Iran militias seek to disrupt oil operations in Iraqi Kurdistan with drone attacks, 15 July 2025, url; The Jerusalem Post, New drone strike near Erbil adds to growing attacks on Kurdistan region - analysis, 30 July 2025, url
[88] The Arab Weekly, Pro-Iran militias seek to disrupt oil operations in Iraqi Kurdistan with drone attacks, 15 July 2025, url; The Jerusalem Post, New drone strike near Erbil adds to growing attacks on Kurdistan region - analysis, 30 July 2025, url
[89] FDD's Long War Journal, Kurdish government blames Iranian-backed PMF for drone attacks targeting Iraqi Kurdistan, 12 July 2025, url
[90] TWI, Militias Strain Credibility by Denying Involvement in Kurdistan Drone Attacks, 25 July 2025, url

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